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PROCEDURAL REFORM AND THE RULE-MAKING
POWER IN NEW YORK
THOMAS A. SHAW, JR.*
A FTER thirty-five years of the Civil Practice Act, which practi-
cally from its inception has been denounced,' and amended, patched
and tinkered with continuously, New York may at last be on the thresh-
old of a complete overhaul of its civil procedure.
The Temporary Commission on the Courts, created by the New York
Legislature in 1953 to study, among other things, ". . . Revision and
simplification of the practice statutes and the enlargement and location
of the rule making power ... *", has recently appointed a committee of
eminent lawyers headed by Dean John F. X. Finn of Fordham Law School
to undertake the task of drafting a completely new body of provisions
governing civil procedure.3
THE NEED FOR PROCEDURAL REFORM
Judged from an historical viewpoint, such a complete revision is emi-
nently due. The unsuccessful efforts to obtain such a revision stretching
back over more than one hundred years of New York judicial history
certainly prove, to paraphrase Chief Justice Vanderbilt, that procedural
reform is no sport for the short-winded. New York has not had a success-
ful over-all review and reorganization of its civil procedure provisions
since David Dudley Field introduced the concept of statutory code plead-
ing and practice into this State in 1848. Unfortunately, while Field's code
was adopted by some thirty American jurisdictions and profoundly in-
fluenced the English practice provisions adopted in the Supreme Court
* Member of the New York Bar; formerly assistant counsel to the Temporary Commis-
sion on the Courts. Presently associated with Breed, Abbott and Morgan, New York City.
Neither the Chairman nor any member of the Advisory Committee nor any member of
the Temporary Commission on the Courts was in any way connected with the preparation of
this article.
1. For a collection of epithets, see Clark & Wright, The Judicial Council and Rule-Making
Power: A Dissent and Protest, 1 Syracuse L. Rev. 346 (1950).
2. N.Y. Laws c. 591 (1953). The Commission has been extended from year to year since
1953.
3. 134 N.Y.L.J. No. 11, p. 4, cols. 1, 2. In addition to Dean Finn, the Committee consists
of Professor Samuel M. Hesson, of Albany Law School; Professor John W. MacDonald of
Cornell Law School; former U.S. District Judge Harold M. Kennedy of New York City;
former New York State Bar Association President, Jackson A. Dykman of Brooklyn; and the
State Solicitor General, James 0. Moore, Jr. of Buffalo. Columbia Law School has made Its
research and drafting services available to the Committee, and Associate Professor Jack B.
Weinstein of Columbia Law School is the Reporter for the Committee, heading a professional
staff of research assistants.
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of Judicature Act of 1875,1 it was never adopted completely in New York.
Instead, only the first and basic portion of the code, which Field himself
later called the "Field Fragment," consisting of 473 sections was adopted
by the New York Legislature in 1848 and 1849--the balance was re-
jected. Instead, many of the old "Revised Statutes" of 1827 and 1828,
which were more often than not attempts to codify the absurdities and
complexities of common law pleading, were continued in force and became
part of the Code of Procedure.6
During the next generation, the Legislature, with no discernible thought
for the whole picture, passed flurries of amendments and additions to the
Code at almost every session until it grew into ". . . a conglomeration of
petty provisions purporting to reach into every nook and cranny of prac-
tice and leading to an intolerable rigidity." 7 The result of years of protest
by leaders of the bar, including Field himself, was the perpetration of the
Throop Revision. The underlying principle of this revision, which came to
be known as the Code of Civil Procedure, was apparently to gather all of
the existing practice provisions, governing practice in the utmost detail,
into one volume. It consisted, when completed by the Legislature in 1880,
of 3,356 sections.8
Another generation of protest led to a legislative directive in 1913 to
the Board of Statutory Consolidation, headed by Judge Adolph J. Roden-
beck, to undertake a complete overhaul of civil procedure., The Legis-
lature further directed that the new revision was to consist of a short
practice act containing only "fundamental and jurisdictional matters of
procedure" supplemented by simplified and modernized rules of court regu-
lating the important details of practice.' 0 In 1915 the Rodenbeck Board
4. Clark, Field Centenary Essays 55 (1949). Recently fourteen Brooklyn Supreme Court
justices in supporting the view that New York's judicial system is "second to none through-
out the civilized world" stated that the New York Civil Practice Act and to great extent
the Rules of Civil Procedure "have been adopted in whole or in part by twenty-eight states
and two territories." (N.Y. Times, October 25, 1955). The writer must take exception. No
jurisdiction has adopted the Civil Practice Act "in whole," indeed the act has been so
frequently amended that it has not been sufficiently fixed to be a practical model. If
individual provisions of the act have been emulated elsewhere, the volume of such emulation
would hardly support the statement. The justices were probably referring to the old Field
Code of 1848, which as noted above, was adopted in thirty American jurisdictions although
there was no substantial adoption in New York.
5. Reppy, Field Centenary Essays 34, 35 (1949). N.Y. Laws c. 379 (1848); N.Y. Laws
c. 438 (1849).
6. See N.Y. Assembly Doc. 16 (1850).
7. Hon. Harold R. Medina, Transcript of Public Hearing before the Temporary Commis-
sion on the Courts held on June 22, 1954 in Brooklyn, N.Y. at 133.
8. N.Y. Laws c. 178 (1880).
9. N.Y. Laws c. 713 (1913).
10. Ibid.
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reported back to the Legislature with a proposed Civil Practice Act of 71
sections and a proposed set of 401 rules, which were to be adopted and there-
after amendable by the Justices of the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court." This Rodenbeck draft received widespread support from leading
members of the bar and bar associations and was subsequently to be
widely emulated in other jurisdictions. 2 Upon receiving these proposals,
the Legislature appointed a Joint Legislative Committee to consider them.
In 1919, this Committee rejected Rodenbeck's complete revision,"' and
instead adopted its own revision which consisted principally of dividing
the old Code of Civil Procedure into a broad and detailed Civil Practice
Act, and separate acts for the Surrogates' Courts, the Court of Claims,
Justices' Courts and the City Court of the City of New York.
However, one very significant advance was made in the form of the
delegation of the power to promulgate an enlarged set of supplementary
Rules of Civil Practice to a convention of judges. With minor modifica-
tion, these proposals were enacted by the Legislature in 1920.1 In 1921,
the convention of judges adopted a set of 301 supplementary Rules of
Civil Practice which included a number of advanced devices, such as sum-
mary judgment. These Rules were thereafter amendable by the Justices
of the Appellate Division.', In addition, many local court rules were
adopted or continued, supplementing both the Acts and the Rules.
In 1934, one of the most constructive steps in the direction of genuine
reform of procedure in almost a century was taken with the creation of
the Judicial Council.' 6 During the ensuing twenty years, the Council
brought skilled technical knowledge to the process of piecemeal amend-
ment and did much to improve civil practice in this State. 7
But the fact is that the Judicial Council from its start was confronted
with an overwhelming complex of archaic and disorganized statutes and
general and local court rules; the results of 100 years of constant petty
amendment, addition and relocation, frequently accomplished with little
regard for the whole. Twenty years of such piecemeal amendment, how-
11. Report of Board of Statutory Consolidation on the Simplification of Civil Practice
in New York vol. 1 (1915).
12. Judge Charles E. Clark, one of the principal authors of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure has said of the Rodenbeck draft: "This was an exceedingly able effort, whose only
substantial fault was that it was ahead of its time. It contained to a surprising extent the
provisions now widespread in operation through their adoption in the Federal Rules and
elsewhere." Clark op. cit. supra note 4, at 62.
13. Report of Joint Legislative Committee on Simplification of Civil Practice 29 (1919).
14. N.Y. Laws c. 926 (1920), effective October 1, 1921.
15. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 83 (1945).
16. N.Y. Judiciary Law art. 2-A (1934), repealed by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 869, § 2.
17. According to the 21st Annual Report of the Judicial Council (1955) at 17, the Council
has been responsible for changes in no less than 688 of the 1710 sections of the Civil Practice
Act and 89 of the 259 Rules of Civil Practice.
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ever sound, has not and probably could not succeed in simplifying, mod-
ernizing and streamlining such a body of provisions, and doubtless two
more decades of such amendment would not accomplish the task.
On the contrary, such halfway measures have had the effect of perpetu-
ating the faults of New York's civil procedure. New York has not re-
mained in the forefront of recognized procedural leadership, perhaps for
the very reason that its procedure was brought sufficienfly up to date by
the enactment of the modem Rules of Civil Practice in 1921, and after
1934, by the able repair and patch work of the Judicial Council. There-
fore it did not require the dazzling procedural revolutions which have
brought recognition to the work of the federal and New Jersey procedural
reforms. Unlike those two jurisdictions, it has not had the necessary
"chaos yet within it to give birth to the dancing star."
But if New York procedure has not been a remarkable example of ar-
chaic imbecilities, it has nevertheless continued for generations as a sort
of mediocre patch work of the good and bad, the old and the new. Even
a superficial examination reveals a number of indisputable faults in the
provisions presently governing New York civil procedure, and obvious
need for extensive improvements. Such faults and needs are:
a) drastic reduction in the volume of statutes and rules;",
b) more uniform procedures and procedural forms from court to court
and within each of the various courts from district to district;"'
c) removal from the procedural acts and relocation in the consolidated
laws of hundreds of substantive provisions having no bearing on
procedure;2
0
d) repeal of archaic and totally dormant provisions;21
e) consolidation of provisions covering one subject which are now need-
lessly numerous and hopelessly scattered;'
f) elimination of ancient and arbitrary language distinctions;'
18. There are more than seventy-five separate "acts" governing dvil practice in the
various New York courts, and most of the courts at each echelon have their own county-
wide or district-wide rules. These statutes and rules have, to the writer's kmowledge, never
been collected so that even an estimate of their number is difficult. However it must be
well over 10,000.
19. For example, practice in the Surrogate!s Courts from county to county.
20. See, eg., N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 1132-1165 (1926) dealing with divorce, separation and
annulment.
21. See, eg, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 42 (1920), dealing with "descent cast."
22. For example, service of process by publication is presently governed by N.Y. Civ. Prac.
Act §§ 144-147 (1920), 232 (1946), 232-A (1946), 232-B (1946), 233 (1946), 234 (1920),
1518 (1920), 1551 (1942) and 1574 (1920), by Rules of Civ. Prc. Rules 45 (1933) and S0
(1945), 51 (1935), 52 (1937) and by some local court rules such as Rule X of the Appellate
Division, First Department (1921).
23. For example, process in an "action" is called "summons"; and in a 'proceeding" is
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g) elimination of obvious errors due to careless amendment; 24
h) elimination of ambiguities;2
i) elimination of inconsistencies and redundancies."
These examples apply equally to provisions governing practice in the
inferior courts 7
This type of obvious disrepair is merely symptomatic of the need for
an over-all revision and simplification of civil procedure from service of
process to supplementary proceedings. It is little wonder that the Tem-
porary Commission on the Courts found, after public and private hearings
and consultations with judges, bar association representatives and proce-
dural experts, that there is ". . . a, near unanimity of informed opinion
that the provisions governing New York civil practice are in a state such
that an entirely new and over-all approach is presently needed."2 8 It was
on the basis of this finding that the Commission appointed the present
Advisory Committee.2 9
The present Committee has of course, a most difficult task in drawing
up the initial draft, though certainly no more difficult than that which
faced the three-man Field Commission when it was appointed in 1847 .1
called a "citation", a "writ", an "order" or a "precept" depending upon the kind of proceed-
ing involved.
24. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 640 (1946) which contains a reference to the "next
section"--the reference was clearly to § 641 until § 640-A was pasted in and became the "next
section."
25. For example, sections which use the phrase, "except as otherwise provided by law"
without indicating whether such exceptions exist or, if so, where, such as, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act
§§342 (1941), 344-A (1943).
26. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 242 (1920) which provides that a party "shall" raise
in his pleading the defense of statute of limitations; N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 30 (1921) which
provides that this defense "can" be raised by answer or motion; and Rules of Civ. Prac. 107
(1944) which provides that it "may" be raised by motion.
27. For instance, at least five City Court Acts still provide that portions of procedure shall
be governed by provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure which has not existed for thirty-five
years; City Ct. Act of Auburn §§ 138, 140 (1920) ; City Ct. Act of Amsterdam §§ 131, 134,
135 (1911) ; City Ct. Act of Geneva §§ 112, 113 (1897) ; City Ct. Act of Lackawanna §§ 193,
194 (1909) and City Ct. Act of Rensselaer §§ 308,317, 322 (1915).
28. 1955 Report, Temporary Commission on the Courts, Leg. Doc. No. 45 at 20 (1955).
29. Id. at 21.
30. "In preparing the Code of Procedure, Field had nothing to build on. He could not
codify common law and equity pleading and practice as it stood in New York in 1847 ...
What was demanded was not a simple Legislative promulgation of common-law and equity
pleading and practice as they were. The demand was for a complete Legislative overhauling
to bring forth a modern unified procedure in which law and equity were administered in one
court, according to one procedure, and if need be in one proceeding, with no forms of actions,
and with elimination of a great mass of technicality.... Field had of necessity to strike
out new lines, and with little to guide him but his legal learning and the instinct of a practical
lawyer, worked out a system of procedure which endured for a century and left Its mark on
procedure today." Pound, Field Centenary Essays 12 (1949).
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But no matter how excellent the proposed revision may be when completed,
there will still remain the equally difficult task of the body or bodies
responsible for enacting it, in resolving the inevitable differences of opinion
concerning individual provisions.
Here there become relevant the questions which the Legislature has
posed to the Temporary Commission on the Courts- should the power
of the judicial branch to enact procedural provisions be enlarged so that
that branch rather than the Legislature shall be primarily responsible for
the adoption of a broad revision? And where in the judicial branch should
such power be located?
THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE JUDICIAL RULE-MAKING POWER
There is a natural and honest reluctance on the part of legislators
to take the responsibility for enacting sweeping revisions and changes in
judicial procedures. Many legislators are totally uninformed and unin-
terested in this large, difficult and technical field, and all of them are
necessarily involved in legislative matters of much greater general and
political importance. No doubt at least in part, as a result of this reluc-
tance, the United States Congress and the Legislatures of twenty-eight
states have vested substantially complete responsibility for judicial proce-
dures in the judicial branch of their respective jurisdictions, most of them
during the last twenty years.31
Experience in these jurisdictions has taught that major procedural re-
form can best be achieved in this era of complicated litigation by such a
delegation of responsibility for it to the judicial branch. 2 Indeed many
feel that it can only be achieved in this manner. The American Bar Asso-
ciation's minimum standards of judicial administration lays down the
vesting in the judiciary of the power and responsibility for procedural rules
as the key to procedural reform.a3 Judge Harold R. Medina, one of the
most outstanding experts on New York Civil Procedure before his ascend-
ancy to the federal bench, states that to his knowledge ". . . no juris-
diction has achieved major procedural reform except by proceeding in this
31. Prior to 1934, the year in which the United States Congress vested the power in the
United States Supreme Court (28 US.C.A. 2072 (1949)), nine states had vested the power in
their respective judicial branches: Colorado, Delaware, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey,
Texas, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin. Since that year, nineteen more have done so:
Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Miaouri,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, West
Virginia and Wyoming.
32. Of the jurisdictions listed in note 31 supra, only three have failed to achieve a major
procedural reform subsequent to the vesting of the power in the Judiciary-Idaho, Rhode
Island and Connecticut. The latter vested the power only in 1953. Work on a major revision
is presently in progress.
33. 63 A.BA. Rep. 523 (1938).
1955]
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manner [vesting the rule-making power in the judiciary, thereafter aided
by a drafting committee of procedure experts] and more than one-half of
our American jurisdictions have proceeded in this manner. New York
should do likewise."'
These views tend to be corroborated by the fact previously noted, that
while New York has produced two drafts of procedural provisions
which have been widely adopted elsewhere, the Field Code (1848) and
the Rodenbeck draft of 1915, both were substantially rejected by the New
York Legislature, which instead clung to most of the then existing proce-
dural provisions.
For New York today, the issue is not whether the concept of judge-
made procedural rules should now be adopted. It always has accepted
this concept, and since 1921, the concept has been broadly applied in the
Rules of Civil Practice. Nor is the issue, as apparently many have as-
sumed, whether the Judiciary shall now be given the power in this field
for the sole purpose of permitting the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The fact is that most of the Federal Rules, including
some of the most controversial Rules providing for broad summary judg-
ment, abolition of bills of particulars, limited motion practice and pre-trial
conferences, and even to a large extent broad depositions and discovery,
could be adopted today as Rules of Civil Practice by the Justices of the
Appellate Division without conflicting with the Civil Practice Act.
The issue is simply whether New York's present system of having proce-
dure laid down roughly one-half by the Legislature and one-half by the
Justices of the Appellate Division, supplemented by "local" court rules,
should be continued.
If it could be said that the Legislature lays down only the basic proce-
dural concepts in the Civil Practice Act, leaving to the Appellate Division
the function of providing the details in the Rules of Civil Practice, divided
responsibility would at least have a rational basis.
But the present division of responsibility is entirely arbitrary and hap-
hazard, with the Legislature laying down many petty provisions governing
details, while the Appellate Division lays down all of the Rules governing
broad and vital areas of procedure. Certainly, no one could rationally
insist that this present division is based on any sound or constitutionally
sacred precept. There could be no reasonable justification for insisting
that, in any new revision and modernization of New York procedure, the
areas now covered higgledy-piggledy by the Civil Practice Act must con-
tinue to be governed by the Legislature and the Rules of Civil Practice
relegated only to their present scope. One of the great benefits that the
34. Hon. Harold R. Medina, Transcript of Public Hearing before Temporary Commission
on the Courts held in Brooklyn, New York, June 22, 1954, at 134-35.
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new revision could bestow would be a rational assignment of this respon-
sibility.
Reflection on this point however, suggests that even an approximately
equal division of the responsibility can only be made on an arbitrary and
highly artificial basis. The fact is that the provisions governing civil
procedure are much too complicated and interdependent to provide any
sound division of responsibility and demands that either the Legisla-
ture or the Judiciary have a substantially complete responsibility. Any
other kind of division can only continue to result in doubt as to powers
and responsibilities which tends to defeat over-all review by either branch
of government, while providing each -with an escape from the responsibility
for inaction. Thus, it follows that either the Civil Practice Act or the
Rules of Civil Practice must be greatly enlarged at the expense of the
other.
There seems little doubt that the choice should be in favor of substan-
tially enlarging the scope of the Rules of Civil Practice, thus placing the
primary responsibility for New York Civil Procedure squarely in the judi-
cial branch. To do so would not by any means eliminate the Legislature's
power in the field since it would be free, even as it is now, to override rules
by legislative enactment. 5 Furthermore, if there are indeed areas of pro-
cedure which vitally affect social policy, as some writers claim (the only
one that is ever cited is the injunction in labor disputes), then these might
be left to legislative enactment.
The general arguments in favor of such broadened judicial rule-making
have been stated by many commentators and need not be rehearsed at
length again here. They are well summarized in a recent statement by
Judge Fuld of the New York Court of Appeals:
'"Regulation of Court procedure belongs in the Courts rather than with the Legla-
ture. The latter body has neither time nor experience to give proper attention to the
matter. Legislation is based, as often as not, upon occasional hardship observed by a
legislator without evaluating the effect of rule generally. Legislative rules are rigid
and difficult of amendment. The judges, on the other hand, are engaged in the adminis-
tration of justice as an everyday business and they know by actual experience what
must be done. Rules promulgated by Court will rarely be applied in such a way as to
result in injustice, whereas Courts may excuse a hard result stemming from legislative
rule on the ground that the Legislature has so written the law '30
It seems likely that the New York Legislature would not oppose but
indeed would favor such a substantial enlargement of the scope of the
Rules of Civil Practice. Since 1921, when the Rules of Civil Practice were
35. Broome County Farmers' Fire Relief Ass'n v. New York State Electric Corp., 239 App.
Div. 304, 268 N.Y. Supp. 131 (3d Dep't 1933), aff'd, 264 N.Y. 614, 191 N.E. S91 (1934);
Rigney v. Rigney, 127 N.Y. 403,28 N.E. 405 (1891); Rice v. Ehele, 55 N.Y. 58 (1874).
36. Hon. Stanley Fuld, Transcript of Public Hearing before Temporary Commrion on the
Courts, held in New York City, September 16, 1954, at 168-69.
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first promulgated, the Legislature has itself, on a number of occasions,
enlarged the area of the Rules by repealing statutes and in their place
simply providing that the subject matter should be governed by the
Rules.8 7
Furthermore, the Legislature has avoided taking the primary respon-
sibility for the procedural rules of its own quasi-judicial creatures, such
as the Workmen's Compensation Board, 8 the State Labor Relations
Board,8" and the Rent Commission,40 but rather has given them substan-
tially complete power to make their own rules of procedure. It would be
extremely difficult to rationalize the vesting of such power in a legislative
creature composed of legislative appointees while refusing to vest it in
judges representing a separate and equal branch of government.
The New York Legislature rarely sits more than three months per year
and then usually only two or three days per week. It has an enormous
volume of important legislative business to consider each year. Its desire
to be relieved of this burden is clear from its direction to the Temporary
Commission on the Courts to study the "enlargement," rather than the
reduction, of the judicial rule-making power.
LOCATION OF THE RULE-MAKING POWER
If the scope of the Rules of Civil Practice is to be expanded so as
substantially to cover the entire field of civil procedure, and indeed even
if it is to be left at its present half-way mark, the present vesting of the
power to promulgate these rules in a majority of the twenty-six Justices
of the Appellate Division, should be critically examined.
It seems obvious that the Appellate Division is not by any means an
ideal repository for this power. The twenty-six Justices live and work in
widely separated areas of a large state. They seldom, if ever, assemble
in one place. They are divided into four completely separate courts and
have no unified organization and no responsible single head. The First
and Second Departments, which embrace only the New York City metro-
politan area have between them fourteen of the Justices, while the Third
and Fourth Departments covering the entire upstate area have only twelve
justices between them, so that theoretically at least the metropolitan view-
point on procedural problems could always prevail. Perhaps most impor-
tant of all, these Justices are heavily engaged in appeals on specific points
of law and do not have any staff of their own to review the body of proce-
dural provisions as a whole, initiate desirable reforms and do the necessary
37. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 140 (1940) and 247 (1936).
38. N.Y. Workmen's Compensation Law § 117 (1946).
39. N.Y. Labor Law §§ 702 (1954), 703 (1940), 704 (1937), 705 (1942), 706 (1937), 707
(1942).
40. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 8588 (1951).
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preliminary research and drafting. The result is that proposed amend-
ments to the Rules must be circulated amongst the four departments and
separately considered by each without expert technical assistance. Pre-
siding Justice Foster, of the Appellate Division, Third Department, has
recently described this system as:
"... a very cumbersome one. The Appellate Divisions adopt [proposed amendments]
separately and you have to circulate them around.... I do not think all four Depart-
ments have given the thorough study that they should receive. In fact, I know they
don't."41
New York has, however, in the Judicial Conference newly created by
the 1955 Legislature, what would seem to be an ideal body in which to
vest the power over and responsibility for procedural rules. The Con-
ference, which supersedes the Judicial Council43 and already has been
assigned the Council's former function of studying and recommending
improvements in judicial procedure,4 consists of the Chief Justice of the
Court of Appeals as chairman, the Presiding Justices of each of the four
departments of the Appellate Division and one Supreme Court trial justice
from each of the four departments, elected by the Supreme Court trial
justices of the respective departments.0 Thus it is small in number and
therefore functional, geographically representative, and it is representative
of the trial courts where most procedural provisions are actually applied,
yet has the benefit of the more detached and experienced views, as well as
the prestige, of the chiefs of the top appellate courts of the state.
Of prime importance is the fact that the Conference will have its own
staff, headed by the State Administrator for the Courts.40 This staff will
have among its tasks that of collecting and evaluating data on the work
of the courts, which will be of immense assistance in evolving procedural
rules to best suit changing needs. The staff, like the staff of the former
Judicial Council, will undoubtedly include experts on procedure and draft-
ing who could assist the Conference in carrying out the rule-making power.
Also of prime importance is the fact that the Conference has a built-in
pipeline to the trial bench and the practicing bar in the form of depart-
mental committees and conferences. 4 7 The departmental committees,
headed by the respective Presiding Justices and composed of representa-
tives from the trial bench and bar of each judicial district within the
41. Hon. Sydney F. Foster, Transcript of Public Hearing before Temporary Commi-sion
on the Courts held in Albany, New York, June 29, 1954, at 24.
42. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 869, adding art. 7-A to N.Y. Judiciary Law (1909).
43. The Council was abolished, N.Y. Sess. Laws c. 869 (1955), § 2, and the Conference
given all its powers in addition to other powers, N.Y. Judiciary Law § 233 (12) (195S).
44. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 233 (1) (1955).
45. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 230 (195S).
46. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 233 (11) (1955).
47. N.Y. Judiciary Law §§ 235-38 (1955).
1955]
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department will annually convene a departmental conference of interested
judges, attorneys, legislators and others to consider criticisms and sug-
gestions concerning the conduct of the courts and judicial business, includ-
ing procedures. Based on this annual conference, and its own studies, each
departmental committee will be required to submit an annual report to
the State Judicial Conference
".. . on the effectiveness of the procedures and practices of the courts within its depart-
ment and its recommendations and those of the departmental conference within the
department with respect to general improvements in the conduct of the business of
the courts therein." 48
The Judicial Conference must meet at least twice a year 9 so that there
will be a periodic forum before which judges and lawyers most concerned
with procedure may have their views considered.
New York's good fortune in having created such an excellent repository
for the rule-making power5" just at the very time that it is undertaking
a major procedural revision is compounded by the fact that possibly un-
like any other jurisdiction in the country, there can be little if any doubt
that in New York the rule-making power can be vested in just such a
body as the Conference without constitutional amendment.
The Federal Government and all but three of the twenty-eight states
which now have substantially complete judicial rule making, have vested
the power in their highest appellate courts.5 ' This was not necessarily
done out of choice but in many cases out of probable constitutional
necessity. The problem has not been whether a legislative grant of
the power to the judicial branch is an unconstitutional delegation of
an exclusively legislative power, since the power has uniformly been held to
be historically inherent in the courts, and therefore not exclusively legis-
lative. 2 But while it is generally considered in American jurisdictions
that courts have an inherent power in the absence of conflicting legisla-
tion to regulate their own proceedings, the power of one court or group of
judges to make rules for all the courts (i.e. "supervisory rule-making
power") even under a legislative grant has raised some doubts.
48. N.Y. judiciary Law § 237 (1955).
49. N.Y. judiciary Law § 232 (1955).
50. At its public hearings last year, concerning the creation of the Conference, the Tem-
porary Commission on the Courts posed the question whether the Conference would be an
appropriate repository for the rule-making power. The response was overwhelmingly In the
affirmative, significantly including all of the Justices of the Appellate Division who spoke on
the point.
51. The three exceptions are Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Delaware, which have vested
the power in the entire body of the judges of their trial courts of general jurisdiction. The
constitutionality of this delegation of power does not appear to have been passed upon In
any of these jurisdictions.
52. See, e.g., U.S. Bank v. Halstead, 10 Wheat. 51, 60 (1825). See also Pound, Regulation
of Judicial Procedure by Rules of Court, 10 Ill. L. Rev. 163 (1916).
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The first ground upon which the delegation of such supervisory rule-
making power to the courts of last resort has been justified is historical
precedent. In most jurisdictions, from the beginning of the court system,
the highest court has made rules for the lower courts and this function is
said to have been derived, as an historically inherent power, from the
'hstorical equivalent" of such courts, the Court of Kings Bench, which
sitting en banc at Westminster, heard appeals and made rules of procedure
for all the British courts.5 3
The second ground for upholding the delegation of the power has been
found in the constitutions of most American jurisdictions, which expressly
vest "superintending control" over inferior courts, or following the federal
model, vest the "judicial power" in the highest appellate court, thus giving
them an implied supervisory rule-making power. 4
It has been assumed in these jurisdictions therefore, that the power to
make rules binding on other courts is inherent only in the highest court
and that lower courts or judicial councils representative of a cross-section
of courts could not be vested with the power without constitutional
amendment.5
New York's unique judicial history however leads to the opposite result.
In this State, the Supreme Court was created in 1691 as the highest court
of the State. 6 The entire body of Supreme Court Justices sitting en bane
at General Term, not only heard appeals, but following the precedent of
the Court of Kings Bench, made procedural rules for all the courts of the
State from the beginning. After the enactment of the Revised Statutes
of 1827 and 1828, these rules were, however, subject to a growing body
of legislative enactments.
Despite the creation of the Court of Appeals as the highest court in the
State in the Constitution of 1846, this power was specifically continued
in the Justices of the Supreme Court by provision of the Field Code of
1848, 57 and no supervisory rule-making power whatever was vested in or
exercised by the Court of Appeals either then or at any later date.
The entire body of Supreme Court Justices continued to exercise the
power until 1870, when, the number of justices having grown unwieldy,
53. Pound, op. cit. supra note 52, at 172. See, e.g., Ernst v. Lamb, 73 Colo. 132, 213 Pac.
994 (1923) ; People v. Callopy, 358 Ill. 11, 192 N.E. 634 (1934) ; State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397,
60 P. 2d 646 (1936); State v. Superior Court, 148 Wash. 1, 267 Pac. 770 (1928); In re Con-
stitutionality of Sec. 251.18, 204 Wis. 501, 236 N.W. 717 (1931).
54. See, e.g., Burney v. Lee, 59 Ariz. 360, 129 P. 2d 303 (1942); Kolkman v. People, 89
Colo. 8, 300 Pac. 575 (1931). See Annot., 110 A.L.R. 55 (1937); 112 A.LY.R 1351 (1938);
158 A.L.R. 705, 720 (1945). See also cases cited note 53 supra.
55. Warner, The Role of the Courts and Judicial Councils in Procedural Reform, 85 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 441 (1937).
56. 1 Colonial Laws of New York (Comp. Stat. Rev. Comm.) 226, 229, 230 (1S94).
57. N.Y. Laws c. 379, § 389 (1848); N.Y. Laws c. 438, §§ 469, 470 (1849).
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the power was restricted to the Justices of the General Term of the Su-
preme Court, plus the Chief Judges of the City Superior Courts and of the
Courts of Common Pleas of New York and Brooklyn."' The Appellate
Division was created by the Constitution of 1894, and was thereupon
vested with the rule-making power until 1920.11 This exercise of the rule-
making power through the years appears to have been without constitu-
tional challenge or doubt.
In 1920, the Legislature, in connection with the enactment of the Civil
Practice Act, created a "Convention" of 13 justices ". . .to consider and
adopt Rules of Civil Practice .... ,,0 The make up of the judicial mem-
bership of the Convention bears a striking resemblance to the new Judicial
Conference, for it consisted of four Appellate Division Justices chosen
respectively by the Appellate Division Justices of the four departments,
and nine Supreme Court trial justices chosen respectively by the Supreme
Court trial justices of the (then) nine districts.01
This Convention promulgated the Rules of Civil Practice in 1921 and
its right to do so, in particular to promulgate Rule 113 providing for
summary judgment on motion, was promptly challenged in two cases.
In Hanna v. Mitchell,2 the Appellate Division, First Department, per
Justice Page, who had been Chairman of the Convention, placed its deci-
sion upholding the power of the Convention to adopt the Rules squarely
on an historical basis, rather than citing the Constitution as its authority.
The opinion reviewed the historically continuous role of the Supreme
Court in rule-making since colonial times, including the exercise of the
power between 1870 and 1896 by a convention of General Term Supreme
Court Justices and the chief judges of other courts of record, and noted
that the 1921 Convention resembled the entire body of Supreme Court
Justices which initially had exercised the power since all of the Justices
were "represented by their chosen delegates." The court concluded:
"We conclude that the power to make rules of practice is a judicial power inherent in,
and expressly conferred upon the Supreme Court; that the act creating the convention
to adopt rules of civil practice merely provided a method and means whereby the court
could conveniently and expeditiously exercise its judicial duty, and was in no sense a
delegation of legislative power by the Legislature."6 3
In the second case, General Investment Co. v. Interborough Rapid
58. N.Y. Laws c. 408, § 13 (1870).
59. N.Y. Laws c. 946 (1895) (§ 17, N.Y. Code of Civ. Proc., transferred to §§ 93, 94, N.Y.
judiciary Law in 1909).
60. N.Y. Laws c. 902 (1920).
61. The Convention also included as non-voting members, the Attorney General and
representatives of the Legislature and the bar.
62. 202 App. Div. 504, 196 N.Y. Supp. 43 (1st Dep't 1922), aff'd without opinion, 235
N.Y. 534, 139 N.E. 724 (1923).
63. 202 App. Div. at 513, 196 N.Y. Supp. at 52.
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Transit Co.,64 the Court of Appeals quoted this conclusion and expressly
adopted it in disposing of the same point.65
It is almost certain that, on the authority of these two decisions which
have never been questioned by any court, the Judicial Conference would
be held to be a perfectly proper method and means whereby the Supreme
Court Justices, through their representatives, could "conveniently and ex-
peditiously" exercise the rule-making power. The presence of the Chief
Justice of the Court of Appeals on the Judicial Conference amongst the
eight Supreme Court and Appellate Division Justices has a direct prece-
dent in the presence of chief judges of various inferior courts of record
who, together with the Justices of the Supreme Court General Term made
up the rule-making Convention which existed from 1870 to 1894, without
any expression of constitutional doubt either during that time(' or in the
fanna case which refers to it.
Thus, unlike other American jurisdictions, the constitutional doubt in
New York exists, not with respect to vesting a body such as the Judicial
Conference with the rule-making power, but rather with veting the power
in the Court of Appeals.
Clearly, there would be no historical basis for upholding the exercise
of the power by the Court of Appeals, for it would be totally unprece-
dented. Although the Court of Appeals has always made its own rules, it
has never made procedural rules for any of the lower courts. Furthermore,
there is nothing in the New York Constitution comparable to the United
States Constitution or that of most states vesting the "judicial power" or
"superintending control" in the highest court.6 7 On the contrary, article
VI, section 7, of the New York Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals with certain exceptions not relevant here, "to the review
of questions of law."6 s The Supreme Court, on the other hand, has
"general Jurisdiction ' ' O and the Appellate Division has such jurisdiction
".... as is now or may hereafter be prescribed by law.", as well as the
specific power to supervise Supreme Court calendars and assignments
.. .or to make rules therefore 70
Finally, the Court of Appeals itself has expressly confirmed that the
64. 235 N.Y. 133, 139 N.E. 216 (1923).
65. Id. at 143, 139 N.E. at 220.
66. See, e.g., Rice v. Ehele, 55 N.Y. 518 (1874).
67. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (1789) ; see note 54 supra.
68. The Court of Appeals itself has said, "The constitutional convention dearly entertained
the opinion that the continued existence of the Court of Appeals was justified only by the
necessity that some tribunal should exist with supreme power to authoritatively declare and
settle the law uniformly throughout the state." Reed v. McCord, 160 N.Y. 330, 335, 4 N.E.
737, 738 (1899).
69. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 1 (1953).
70. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 2 (1953).
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power to make rules of practice for the Supreme Court and inferior courts
".. . is a judicial power inherent in and expressly conferred upon the
Supreme Court. . . 2"' The use of the inherent power phraseology,
meaning "an authority possessed without being derived from another'" 2
does not of course mean that power is exclusively in the Supreme Court-
there was and is no doubt that the Legislature has constitutional predomi-
nance over the Supreme Court in the procedural field and that Rules of
Civil Practice must yield to conflicting legislation provisions. 3 The phrase
would seem to mean at least that in the absence of legislation, delegating
the power elsewhere, it would be exclIsively in the Supreme Court.74 But
it could be argued that the court meant that the continuous and unques-
tioned exercise of the power by the Supreme Court Justices or their repre-
sentatives since the beginning of the State's judicial history precludes the
Legislature from delegating the power elsewhere than to the Supreme
Court Justices or their representatives.
It may be that the delegation of the power to the Court of Appeals could
be upheld on the same basis that delegation of powers to administrative
agencies has been found constitutional-i.e., the power is not ".... inher-
ently and exclusively legislative, . . ." and the delegation is made subject
to explicit standards for its exercise. 5 Most of the enabling acts have not,
however, contained any standards other than phrases like that contained
in section 83, Judiciary Law ". . . not inconsistent with any statute. . ....
which would hardly seem sufficient. Significantly, such a theory as the sole
ground for upholding the delegation of the supervisory rule-making power
does not appear to have been suggested by any court nor any commentator,
who instead have relied on elaborate grounds of historical inherency and
constitutional implication. One of the difficulties of this theory is that it
would seem to carry within it the proposition that the Legislature could
vest the power completely outside the judicial branch-in a legislative
commission or agency for example.76 Yet there seems no other basis on
71. General Investment Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 235 N.Y. 133, 143, 139
N.E. 216, 220 (1923).
72. Black, Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951).
73. See note 35 supra.
74. In Hanna v. Mitchell, 202 App. Div. 504, 512, 196 N.Y. Supp. 43, 51 (1st Dep't 1922),
the First Department said in discussing the provision in the Revised Statutes of 1828 for the
Supreme Court's rule-making power, that the power ". . . would have been conferred on the
Supreme Court without the express grant of such power contained in the act."
75. Village of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, Electric Light, and Power Co., 191 N.Y.
123, 138, 83 N.E. 693, 697 (1908) and cases cited in McKinny's Annotations to N.Y. Const.
art. III, § 1 (1894).
76. It is to be noted in this connection that the New York Legislature's power to regulate
judicial procedures is not plenary but consists only of such power as it "... has heretofore
exercised." N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 20 (1925). See Riglander v. Star Co., 98 App. Div. 101, 105,
90 N.Y. Supp. 772, 775 (1st Dep't 1904), aff'd, 181 N.Y. 531, 73 N.E. 1131 (1905) in which
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which the New York Court of Appeals could be given the power.
Suffice it to say that it appears to this writer that while there is doubt
as to the constitutionality of vesting the supervisory rule-making power
in the Court of Appeals,?r there is substantially no doubt that the power
could be vested in the Judicial Conference.
On the other hand, it would seem equally doubtful, from a constitutional
viewpoint, whether the Judicial Conference could be given the power to
make rules governing procedure in the Court of Appeals. The doubt arises
on the same grounds as noted above-the power of the Supreme Court
Justices or their representatives to make such rules is neither historically
inherent nor is it precedented.7 1 Nor is there any provision in the New
York Constitution which would suggest such a power. On the contrary,
the power to make its own rules, is undoubtedly and historically inherent
in the Court of Appeals. The result is that a delegation of this power to
the Conference could be sustained in the Conference only on the same
untried theory that would support a delegation of the supervisory power
to the Court of Appeals-that it is a power which the Legislature can dele-
gate to any agency of government which it wishes, subject to proper stand-
ards for its exercise. A solution resolving any doubt on the point might be
to provide that rules adopted by the judicial Conference for the Court of
Appeals would be effective only if they are and remain consistent with
rules adopted by the Court of Appeals for itself.7D
CONCLUSION
It is contemplated that the task of the Advisory Committee will require
several years to complete, especially since the Committee intends to obtain
the views and collaboration of the bench, bar and interested public and
the Appellate Division said: "The courts are not the puppets of the Legislature. They are an
independent branch of the government, as necessary and powerful in their sphere as either of
the other great divisions. And while the Legislature has the power to alter and regulate the
proceedings in law and equity, it can only exercise such power in that respect as it has here-
tofore exercised... !'
77. The New York Judicial Council staff, in a memorandum discusg a proposal to vest
the power in the Court of Appeals, stated, without discussion of the point, that it was
... reasonably certain... 2' that the proposal would be constitutional. 10th N.Y. Jud.
Council Rep. at 162 (1944). The proponents of the proposal came to the same conclusion,
again without discussion other than a citation of the Hanna case. Proposal to Empower the
Court of Appeals to Make Rules of Procedure for the Courts of the State of New York, 2
The Record at 12-26 (1947). The Judicial Council eventually rejected the proposal, 13th N.Y.
Jud. Council Rep. at 55 (1947). See Clark & Wright, op. cit. supra note 1.
78. California appears to be the only state in which a majority of lower court judges,
through the California Judicial Council, make rules for the highest court, but this is done
pursuant to article VI, § I(a) of the California Constitution.
79. This was the solution proposed by the Committee on Court Rules of the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York whose report states that the Court of Appeals had indicated
it was satisfactory. The Extension of the Rule-Making Power, at 694 (1934).
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private organizations through public hearings and private conferences in
the course of its work.
The final draft will thus be a distillation of thousands of hours of con-
centrated and highly expert thought and research not only by members
of the Committee, but, it is hoped, by judges, lawyers and laymen through-
out the State. Inevitably, however, there will be differences of opinion,
some of them in vital areas. The resolution of these differences will,
if the present haphazard outlines of the scope of responsibility of the
Legislature and the Justices of the Appellate Division remain as they are
presently drawn, be extremely difficult. This present irrational division
of responsibility would almost inevitably lead to destruction of the unity
and coordination of the whole revision for which the authors will have
strived.
Furthermore, it is reasonable to predict that if any major portion of the
revision must run the legislative gauntlet, with all its pressures for indi-
vidual changes, not only from individual legislators, who are practicing
attorneys, but from others with special axes to grind, and with the inevi-
table lack of both interest and background technical knowledge on the
part of most legislators, this new revision will meet the same fate of sub-
stantial emasculation in favor of the status quo that was suffered at the
hands of the Legislature by the Field draft of 1848 and the Rodenbeck
draft of 1915.
The New York Legislature has already accepted the concept of delega-
tion of the responsibility to adopt procedural rules. It has already given
substantially complete responsibility for procedural rules to many of the
various quasi-judicial boards and commissions which it has created. Fur-
ther, the Legislature has already given to the judicial branch the respon-
sibility to enact Rules of Civil Practice covering perhaps one-half of the
civil procedural field.
The New York Legislature should now do what twenty-nine other
American legislatures have done-entrust to the judicial branch substan-
tially complete responsibility for adopting and nurturing New York civil
procedure. It should do so now specifically so that the responsibility for
adopting the projected over-all revision will be placed in the most experi-
enced, knowledgeable and trustworthy hands available.
Within the judicial branch, the Judicial Conference seems the ideal
repository for this responsibility. Unlike the two other most likely reposi-
tories, the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals, (1) the Confer-
ence has a full time staff of experts capable of making the necessary
detailed studies of alternative proposals; (2) it is representative of the
trial as well as the appellate benches; and (3) it has a built-in pipeline to
the whole of the trial bench and practicing bar.
The Conference has the additional advantage over the Justices of the
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Appellate Division of being a small functional body which will meet regu-
larly as part of its statutory duties. It has the additional advantage over
the Court of Appeals in that there exists very strong judicial authority to
the effect that the Conference could be vested with this responsibility with-
out constitutional amendment, whereas, no such authority exists with
respect to the Court of Appeals-on the contrary both the constitutional
nature and the history of the Court of Appeals leads to doubt on the point.
Accordingly, it is proposed that section 83 of the Judiciary Law, and
other relevant statutory provisions be amended (1) to remove the rule-
making power from the majority of the Justices of the Appellate Division
and vest it in the Judicial Conference, and (2) to provide that the Rules
of Civil Practice shall be subject only to substantive, as opposed to proce-
dural legislative enactments and specifically that existing statutes gov-
erning procedure shall thenceforth be considered to be Rules of Civil
Practice. 0
By so doing in the next legislative session of 1956, it would be made
clear that the revision will be the responsibility of the Judicial Conference.
The Advisory Committee could thereafter work closely with the Confer-
ence thus affording it the continuous benefit of the advice of the body
which will ultimately adopt the revision.81 In the meantime, the Confer-
ence could make any amendments or new rules deemed immediately
necessary.
Under this proposal, the Legislature would not have abdicated its con-
stitutional power to override Rules of Civil Practice or indeed to revoke
the rule-making power entirely."2 It would, however, have placed an
undivided primary responsibility for revising and simplifying civil proce-
dure upon a body from which the people of this State could require and
expect a sound and simple civil procedure. And such procedural rules
would go a long way toward mitigating the present triple threat to the
true administration of justice in this State-excessive delays, excessive
cost, and the decision of causes on procedural technicalities rather than the
merits.
80. This has been the transition formula in most of the rule-making states. It can probably
best be effected by a legislative adoption of a schedule of those statutory sections deemed
procedural at the time that the rule-making statute is enacted. In New York, the sthedule
could be initially prepared by the judicial Conference.
81. Although the Advisory Committee is now working under the aegis of the Temporary
Commission on the Courts, that Commission may well complete its work and make its final
report to the 1956 or 1957 Legislature, resulting in its termination.
82. See note 35 supra. There seems no good reason for adopting the federal provision that
proposed rules must be submitted to the Legislature and become effective automatically at
the end of the legislative session unless the Legislature otherwise enacts. The provision really
adds nothing to the Legislature's power, its only practical effect being to delay the effective
date of the proposed rule. New York has never had such a requirement either with respect
to the Rules of Civil Practice or other court rules.
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